Atrocity Crimes Litigation: Year-In-Review (2010) Conference Abridged Transcript by unknown
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights
Volume 9 | Issue 3 Article 6
Summer 2011
Atrocity Crimes Litigation: Year-In-Review (2010)
Conference Abridged Transcript
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation





Copyright 2011 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 9, Issue 3 (Summer 2011) 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 
ATROCITY CRIMES LITIGATION: 
YEAR-IN-REVIEW (2010) 
CONFERENCE  
Abridged Transcript  
January 31, 2011 
Northwestern University School of Law 
DAVID SCHEFFER, MODERATOR 
 
PROFESSOR AT THE NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
Welcome everyone, to the Fourth Annual Atrocity Crimes 
Litigation Year-in-Review (2010) Conference here at Northwestern 
University School of Law in Chicago.  
This was an extremely dynamic year in the war crimes 
tribunals.  We're examining the practice and jurisprudence of five 
separate tribunals: the International Criminal Court in The Hague, 
the permanent court; the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, also in The Hague; the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, in Arusha, Tanzania; the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, in Freetown, Sierra Leone; and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 
 
VALERIE OOSTERVELD, ACADEMIC COMMENTATOR  
 
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO 
 
To begin with the International Criminal Court, I think one of 
the most significant moments to me, at any rate, was the clarification 
of the standard of proof at the warrant issuance stage in the Al Bashir 
case, which is the Darfur case before the International Criminal 
Court.  That resulted in the first genocide charges being able to be 
brought before the International Criminal Court. 
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  In the ICTY, I think that the continued development of 
crimes against humanity in the Popovi  judgment was quite 
significant, although there was an interesting dissent by Judge Prost 
on the issue of persecution in that case.  But in the Popovi  case, 
what I thought to be very important was the continued reinforcement 
that genocide occurred in Srebrenica. 
For the Cambodia Tribunal, the most significant thing was 
the issuance of the Duch judgment, and that was not only significant 
for the Cambodian Tribunal, but I think also for Cambodians 
themselves. The judgment was muddled on the question of 
cumulative convictions, however, where the judges, in essence, 
telescoped almost all of the charges into the crimes against humanity 
of persecution charge, which really worries me. 
The ICTR continued to develop very well on issues related to 
genocide, but I do feel that the Rukundo judgment was muddled 
when the Appeals Chamber reversed a particular charge on sexual 
violence as forming a part of genocide with respect to a particular 
witness.  I think Judge Pocar made it very clear in his dissent that 
when one looks at sexual violence in the context of genocide, one 
has to look at the overall context in which the witness is existing at 
the time. 
And finally in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, we heard 
in the beginning of the year the cross-examination of Taylor, which 
was very exciting.  Then we ended the year in a very interesting way 
when Taylor's trial team refused to file its closing brief.  What it's 




I want to jump now to Tom Hannis, who is our prosecuting 
attorney from the Yugoslav Tribunal in The Hague.  What I would 




SENIOR PROSECUTING TRIAL ATTORNEY IN THE OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
 
Well, for one thing, it gives the Prosecution team a lot of 
confidence.  The practical matter, though, is how do we do that?  In 
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our Rules of Evidence and Procedure we have a provision that you 
could use adjudicated facts from other cases, but the record so far on 
the use of adjudicated facts is spotty. 
In the Luki  and Luki  case, the Prosecution was relying on 
certain adjudicated facts so they wouldn't have to call certain 
witnesses or produce certain exhibits, because there had been a 
finding made concerning an accused in some of the killings that the 
Prosecution was relying on. 
The law developed out of the case, and the Trial Chambers 
found that, well, yes, that's an adjudicated fact, but the Defense can 
challenge it by cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses or calling 
witnesses of their own to undo the fact. 
What happens then was not made clear.  
The Trial Chamber presiding judge made sort of a difficult 
decision for us by holding, well, no, this is something the 
Prosecution should have foreseen would be challenged and should 




I want to move, if I could, to the case that you're working on 
right now, Mr. Dixon, which is the Haradinaj case out of Kosovo.  
There was an extremely dramatic development in this case on July 
21, 2010, in the Yugoslav Tribunal.  The Trial Chamber had actually 
acquitted three members of the Kosovo Liberation Army at that 
point, and yet the Appeals Chamber took that up and reversed and 
remanded it to the Trial Chamber. 
Mr. Dixon, if you could just bring us up to date on what 
happened at the Appeals Chamber on July 21st.  What can you tell 




DEFENSE COUNSEL BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA  
 
The Appeals Chamber didn't overrule the entire acquittal, 
although there were over 40 counts, but it overturned the acquittal 
with respect to one detention facility, which comes down to six 
counts. The Appeals Chamber said there should be a retrial in order 
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to hear two witnesses whom they found the Trial Chamber hadn't 
provided enough of an opportunity to come forward and testify. 
The central issue at the moment is exactly that, whether or 
not those two witnesses will come and testify before the Trial 
Chamber and whether it will be restricted to just those two 
witnesses. 
The Prosecution has made it plain that they want to bring 
new evidence and have another go at it.  I mean, this is very new 
territory for me.  I think it's the same here.  You don't appeal 
acquittals.  When a person is acquitted, that's it.  And now you're in a 
situation where they said the particular witnesses should come back 
to be called, but now the Prosecution wants to bring new evidence, 
entirely new evidence.  So that's the first issue which we're trying to 
litigate. But there's been no decision finalizing that yet.  In fact, we 
tried to take it to the Appeals Chamber to see whether it will tell us 
what their order meant.  It's going to be a very interesting issue, how 
the Appeals Chamber unravels that, because previous to this ruling 
from the ICTR, the Appeals Chamber had to actually explicitly say, 
"Only these two witnesses."  
The other is the whole witness intimidation issue, which has 
received a lot of press in Kosovo recently.  There have been a lot of 
allegations made, and many of them have, in fact, proven not to be 
true about witnesses who were killed in this case. And just to clarify, 
there were none murdered in relation to this trial.  It keeps coming 
up, and I can one hundred percent clarify that point, and I think the 
Prosecution could do that or should do that as well. 
But there's clearly been a big issue surrounding this because 
the Appeals Chamber noted this in the judgment and also referred to 
a new rule now coming, which allows people who can show that 
they've been intimidated to have their statements read into the 
record.  It's only just come now, which is surprising. 
   As far as defense strategy is concerned, I mean, I don't want 
to go on too much more now, but we can discuss this further.  Our 
main point, as I've said, and this is public, is that we want to restrict 
it to the witnesses that are the subject of the appeal.  That's the only 
fair thing to do.  And I suppose our subsidiary argument, which has 
also been made public, is that if the Prosecution is going to provide 
new evidence, they must at least satisfy the due diligence threshold 
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DAVID SCHEFFER 
 
I'm going to give a one-minute rebuttal by Mr. Hannis here.  




The witness intimidation is a difficult problem, and I agree 
with Rod.  It's surprising to me that we've only come around to 
adding it to our rules, you know, 15 years into being in business 
because it's been a problem from the very beginning. 
That case also pointed out one of the weaknesses, I think, 
with the international tribunals because one of the witnesses—the 
Prosecution was trying to get him before it closed its case—was in a 
jurisdiction outside the Netherlands and refusing to come, and we 
sought through the court to have that witness arrested and sent back. 
The country to which we made the request refused because it 
made a finding that contempt, which was the only basis we had to try 
and arrest a witness, was not part of our statute and was not one of 
the international war crimes, and, therefore, it was not something 
that they need to allow extradition for.  That poses a problem 
because if the court can't enforce bringing witnesses, then we could 




And that is a very rebuttable argument.  It's open to a lot of 
discussion because the statutes of the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals are under U.N. Charter Chapter VII authority; states are 
obligated to cooperate. There's been no statement that the 
cooperation ends at the edge of the actual crime itself as opposed to 
the actual proceedings of the court where you have to have witnesses 
appear and document production from governments as well.  
Mr. Smith, let's discuss the Duch judgment before the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. This, for not 
only a general audience, but even for a law audience, requires a little 
bit of explanation as to what happened there.  It’s been somewhat 
different from the way we see judgments being handed down in the 
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals in terms of Duch being convicted 
of crimes against humanity with a particular methodology employed 
by the court to arrive at that determination. This issue forms part of 
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INTERNATIONAL DEPUTY CO-PROSECUTOR OF THE EXTRAORDINARY 
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA  
 
In relation to the Duch judgment of July 26, 2010—and more 
particularly, in relation to how they recorded the convictions in this 
judgment—it was slightly out of kilter following the majority view 
of the Yugoslavia Tribunal.  Meaning, when someone has committed 
a wide range of crimes or a number of crimes that relate to specific 
offenses—as you heard, imprisonment, enslavement, torture, rape, 
murder, extermination—and those offenses have also an associated 
discriminatory intent in those victims being selected for those 
crimes, they can also be charged in a catchall charge of persecution 
because each of those specific crimes are fundamental breaches of 
human rights, which, if committed at a certain level of severity, will 
support a persecution charge. 
So what the Trial Chamber did in this instance was to roll all 
those charges into a sort of a convenient, packaged way and said, 
rather than convict him for all the different counts, let's just convict 
him for persecution because he had that discriminatory intent when 
he selected those victims for those crimes. These other crimes would 
be a fundamental breach of a human right, and, therefore, would fall 
under persecution, and let's just convict him on that. 
  Particularly in Cambodia, I think there's a problem in doing 
that in the sense that it really doesn't give a very clear legal historical 
record about the crimes someone has committed.  This judgment is 
very important for Cambodians in recording a legal history, or as 
close to the truth as you can get, aside from academic books and so 
forth.  And so for the legacy of the Court, for a deterrent, and to 
uphold those social values of the particular offenses of 
imprisonment, rape, torture—even though they occurred 30 years 
ago—it doesn't protect those social values which should be 
recognized, in terms of creating deterrents and accountability for 
those crimes in the country’s official institutions. 
It's important for Cambodians that justice is accessible, that 
they understand it, and that when these types of human rights 
breaches occur even today—of course, not on the scale that occurred 
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I agree completely with the analysis that Bill Smith has 
given.  I thought it was quite surprising that the judges in the Trial 
Chamber of the Cambodia Tribunal chose the minority view from 
the ICTY to rely upon in collapsing all of the charges into the 
persecution charge.  It's important to name what happened, the 
individual types of things that happened.  If I could raise one thing 
that you haven't mentioned, but which is part of your appeal, and that 
is with regards to the crime against humanity of enslavement. 
The court here—and again, I agree with the Prosecution on 
this—just seemed to get the law wrong from my point of view.  
Enslavement is the exercise of powers related to ownership, and the 
judges seemed to say there had to be a forced labor component to 
enslavement. I'm not sure if you have other thoughts on that, but that 
was another concern about collapsing all of these charges and 
misnaming some of the charges. 
 
WILLIAM SMITH  
 
Yeah, I think so.  The law needs to be articulated correctly.  
When you look at the facts of S-21, that was a former high school 
where people, who were perceived to be enemies of the state or the 
wrong class or the wrong backgrounds, were brought into S-21; they 
were tortured and killed.  And over the three-and-a-half-year period, 
there were at least 12,000 people killed; their names were on lists at 
S-21, and there were many thousands more. 
Those people were kept in conditions where they were 
starved, they were chained, they were unable to go to bathrooms, and 
they would hear the torture of others.  We're talking children, 
women, men, elderly, and they would hear the torture of others, they 
would be tortured themselves, and they would be taken from there 
and then taken to an execution site. 
The average time that people were there was a couple of 
months. Talking about the exercise of control when you discussed 
the idea of enslavement, Duch and his staff controlled every aspect 
of their living.  Prisoners were unable to do anything. 
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And for some strange reason, the Trial Chamber, and this is 
the subject of appeal, said that enslavement must have a forced labor 
component.  The slavery conventions and the jurisprudence coming 
from the tribunals don’t require that.  It's not an essential element, 
but it's a significant indicator of that fact.  It just really didn't 
represent the way that the people were treated. They were enslaved 
in every meaning of the word. 
And particularly as we go into the second case, very much 
the theory of the case is that the population of Cambodia was 
enslaved in detention camps, in communes, forced to work, and they 
had very little freedom at all.  Families were broken up, meals were 
controlled.  Everything was completely controlled. So it's important 
that that slavery charge reflects the actual war rather than the way 




If you could give us an overview of the Charles Taylor case, 




CHIEF OF PROSECUTIONS AND HEAD OF OFFICE OF THE OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR FOR THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 
 
As you've indicated, we never claimed that Charles Taylor 
set foot in Sierra Leone; that has never been part of our case.  What 
we claim is that he—whether in a joint criminal enterprise or through 
other modes of liability—was responsible for the crimes that took 
place in Sierra Leone; that indeed through terrorism and other means 
that are crimes under the statute, he sought to take control of the 
people and resources of Sierra Leone and to pillage those resources 
for his own needs. 
In a sense, bringing this trial together was really bringing 
together the trial against the leaders of the Revolutionary United 
Force, the RUF, and the trial against the leaders of the AFRC, the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, and proving Charles Taylor's 
linkage to the crimes that took place in Sierra Leone. 
In our case, although our opening statement was in June of 
2007, our first witness was not until January of 2008.  Our last 
witness testified a year later, at the end of January 2009.  Once some 
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outstanding motions were decided, we were able to close our case in 
February of 2009.  Charles Taylor was the first witness to take the 
stand on his own behalf; he began his testimony in the middle of July 
2009. The Defense estimated that his testimony, including cross-
examination, would last four to six weeks.  Four months later when 
his examination-in-chief ended, the Prosecution's cross-examination 
began, and I believe we finished in February, if I remember right. 
So he was on the stand for seven months, or nearly seven 
months. Twenty witnesses, twenty additional witnesses, came and 
testified on his behalf, and the last one finished up in November. 




Mr. Whiting, if you could bring us into the Al Bashir 
indictment and its developments in 2010, I think that would be a 
good place to start. 
          
ALEX WHITING 
 
INVESTIGATION COORDINATOR IN THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
I think if you look at 2010, the thing that stands out is that it 
was an extraordinarily productive year for us at the ICC.  We have 
three trials going now, and we had a range of important decisions, 
confirmation hearings, arrests, and new cases starting. Across the 
board it's really been an incredibly busy, productive year, and I think 
the significance of that for the ICC and for all the tribunals is, again, 
something that David Scheffer mentioned at the beginning; that you 
know, now I think we can say this field is here to stay, which has 
always been a question mark as to whether this would continue or 
fall away and die. 
So with respect to the Al Bashir case, as Professor Oosterveld 
said, there were decisions about that case with respect to genocide.  
And just to kind of bring you up to date a little bit without getting 
too much into the weeds about what happened when the prosecutor 
presented the case, the prosecutor asked for war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide, and they confirmed the war crimes 
and crimes against humanity charges. The reasoning of the Pre-trial 
Chamber in denying the genocide charge was that while the evidence 
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supported an inference, it was not the only inference that could be 
drawn from the evidence. 
The Prosecution appealed, saying that at the stage of an arrest 
warrant, that was too high a burden to require of the Prosecution, and 
that that was a more appropriate analysis to be done at the trial stage 
than at the arrest stage, and it should be sufficient for the Prosecution 
to show that the evidence supports the inference even if it's not the 
only inference that could be supported, even if genocide was 
committed.  In due course, the Appeals Chamber sent it back to the 
Pre-trial Chamber for reconsideration and approved the genocide 
charge. 
The decision is significant for two reasons:  First, it's 
significant for the Al Bashir case itself, which will, without a doubt, 
have Al Bashir facing these questions in The Hague.  Without a 
doubt, that will happen, at least in my mind. 
         The broader reasoning here is that a case goes through 
progressive stages and gets checked by the court at each stage. There 
are essentially three stages: the arrest warrant stage, the confirmation 
of the charges, and then the trial.  And it's important that the check at 
the arrest warrant stage was held to an appropriate level—was not 
allowed to be overly stringent—because the reality is at that stage 
the Prosecution may not be able because of security considerations—
and this sort of ties back to the issue that Rod Dixon and Tom 
Hannis were talking about with respect to witness security—that the 
Prosecution may not be able to show its full hand at the arrest 
warrant stage because witnesses are protected, there's continued 
insecurity, instability. 
So if the test at the arrest warrant stage were too stringent, 
then the prosecutor would either face the choice of having to show 
more of his hand or drop the case.  So in order to make these cases 
viable and so they can progress, it was an incredibly important 
decision that that check be preserved at the arrest warrant stage—of 




And just remind us that when the Pre-trial Chamber actually 
arrived at its decision on July 12, 2010, they broadened the 
indictment to include the charge of genocide against President Al 
Bashir, but there was actually an interesting sort of matrix of what 
they looked at there.  Why is President Al Bashir being charged with 
 
2011] T R A N S C R I P T  305
genocide?  What happened in Darfur that leads the Prosecution to 




Well, the case the Prosecution has put forward at this stage, 
the theory of the case, is that President Al Bashir was in charge at the 
top of both the government of Sudan and forces which allied with 
Janjaweed forces and which attacked various ethnic groups in Darfur 
with the intent to eliminate those groups. There are various 
approaches that the forces used under the command of Al Bashir—
direct killings of these populations. 
But also, in addition, and maybe this more captures what 
happened, creating conditions that would make it impossible for 
these populations to continue; displacing them to places where they 
could not survive, destroying their ability to have a livelihood, 
destroying any ability to have crops. When they were in these 
locations that were incredibly unstable, if they tried to go out to get 
firewood or food, they would get attacked, killed.  Rapes were part 
of these attacks. 
So the strategy of the government forces aligned with the 
Janjaweed has been to create these conditions of life, or really 




Let me pursue this just a few steps because this is so 
important.  I know that the prosecutor was hoping that there would 
be a clear acceptance by the Pre-trial Chamber under what's called 
Article 6, subparagraph (c) of the Statute that covers genocide, and 
this is the part that reads, "Deliberately inflicting on each target 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's 
physical destruction," which Mr. Whiting was talking about; that, in 
fact, rape would be clearly seen as genocide.  In other words, that 
there would be a direct relationship between rape, which takes place 
outside of these camps, as the women and girls go to get the 
firewood and water, because if the men do so, they get killed.  If the 
women and girls do so, they don't get killed, they get raped, but at 
least they survive.  Somehow the camp has to get wood and water, so 
that's the tradeoff essentially. 
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And what the prosecutor was hoping was, I think, that the 
Pre-trial Chamber would clearly say that the instrument of rape is 
actually a very clearly identifiable instrument of genocide, and they 
think the Pre-trial Chamber left it somewhat vague.  They sort of 
threw it under the notion of torture inferentially, and they didn't 




I think that may overstate a little bit the concern of the 
Prosecution in the case, at least at this stage, bearing in mind that 
these are the early stages when Al Bashir is brought to The Hague, 
as he will be, then he will face confirmation of the charges and there 
can be further amplification. 
But it is true that the way the PC reasoned in the rape 
allegations was not under the 6(c) prong—which you talked about 
and which I was talking about, creating conditions of life to make 
unbearable and unsustainable conditions of life, but under 6(b), 
inflicting mental and bodily harm. But that was not completely 
inconsistent with the way the prosecutor presented the case to the 
Pre-trial Chamber, and it's also significant that the Pre-trial Chamber 
considered rape with respect to the mens rea, the intent of Al Bashir. 
 It was one of the factors that the Pre-trial Chamber noted in 
support of a finding that a reasonable inference could be drawn that 
Al Bashir had the requisite genocidal intent to commit these acts.  So 





I want to turn to Mr. Dixon and Mr. Dieng. Did you want to 
talk a little bit about whether there has been an imbalance in what the 




It's plain to see.  I mean, you don't want to make this sort of 
hack point, which I know people make all the time, that Africa is 
being picked on.  But at the end of the day, you know, when you 
look at the figures, that's what it amounts to. You can't escape that. 
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And I think what's important in this is to be more frank and 
honest about how that has happened, and why it has happened.  I 
mean, the Prosecutor has made certain selections.  I'm for much 
more transparency on this, explaining to people why certain 
selections are made. I mean, in the U.K., and you might have it here, 
you, as a private citizen, can challenge the Prosecution's decision not 
to prosecute somebody or to prosecute somebody. You could take it 
before a court and have it judicially reviewed, and the prosecutor 
then has to give the reasons as to why they've taken the decision.  It's 
not for the court to decide whether that's the right decision, but it has 
to be rational and reasonable and comply with basic human rights 
norms. I don't see why something like that shouldn't be striven for at 
the international level.  We can't go after the Russian generals for 
Georgia, because can you imagine a Russian general ever being 
charged and brought to the ICC?  Well, if we can't, then we should 
just say that and explain the reasons why.  If it's impossible to move 
on Israel, these things should come out. 
I think where the anger begins to grow is when people just 
pretend it's not an issue and say, no, no, no.  Africa wants us to come 
there, it's not that we're biased.  Well, then I think you do have to 
explain what the reasons are for the differences, and especially, I 
think, even more so when there are massive alleged war crimes 
being committed elsewhere.  I mean, we've seen recently what's 
happened in Sri Lanka, for example. In Colombia—the examples 
that Professor Bassiouni gave—there are stark contradictions that 
have to be explained. Otherwise, you simply don't cut the basic logic 




REGISTRAR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA  
 
I think it was not proper that Sudan refused to cooperate with 
the ICC in the case of indicted fugitive Harun.  I think that was an 
insult to all humanity.  That's why I was saying also to the African 
people, let's not forget why we are talking about international 
criminal justice.  Let's not forget the victims, because we are fighting 
for the victims. 
At the end, what I realized today in Africa is that the focus 
has shifted from the victims to the suspect, to the perpetrator, and I 
think that is something which is not correct.  And, unfortunately, 
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that's where one also has to realize that international criminal justice 
is unfortunately closely linked with international politics. 
I do remember those days when we were campaigning for the 
situation in Cambodia to be dealt with. I remember that we were 
saying that there was a genocide in Cambodia, and the U.S. 
government was saying, "No, there is no such thing." 
Today, we have the court in Cambodia thanks to international 
support, and that is to say, things have to move, and what is 




Jim Johnson has already talked about the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone coming to a close.  There's also an end game for the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. 
The Security Council, as mentioned just briefly by Mr. Dieng 
in the morning, took a huge, major step in December, just a month 
ago, with a Security Council resolution that created what we call an 




The issue of the closure of the tribunals is, I think, a 
fascinating one, because there are legal and practical obligations that 
continue after the closure of any particular tribunal.  Just think about 
things like victim protection.  Victim protection can't just end 
because the ICTR and the ICTY closed their doors. 
It's the same with the tracking of fugitives.  Their indictments 
remain valid.  What happens if they get captured after the closure of 
the tribunals?  They need to be tried somewhere, and the same with 
monitoring the sentence enforcement of those who have been 
convicted.  Think about the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  One of 
the indictees was sentenced to 52 years imprisonment, and the 
Special Court is going to close next year.  So there needs to be 
tracking of the sentence enforcement to make sure it's fair, et cetera, 
et cetera. 
These things are called residual issues that continue after the 
closure of these tribunals.  So not only did we need to think about the 
actual ending, how are we going to get things to the end of the 
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current trials of the tribunals; we had to think beyond that, and it had 
to be a sui generis legal setup. 
So there was discussion happening in two different places, 
within the tribunals, which Registrar Dieng will talk about, and at the 
Security Council, because it was the Security Council that created 
the ICTY and ICTR, and, therefore, it's the Security Council that had 
to deal with the residual issues that came after the closure of those 
tribunals. 
So the ICTY and ICTR are on track for closing within the 
next few years, and there are still some very important variables that 
have to be dealt with before or as they move towards closure, which 
I'm sure Registrar Dieng will comment upon, one of which is that the 
tribunals are losing staff at an alarming rate, and that is having an 
impact on how soon they can close.  Also, the ICTR Office of the 
Prosecutor has asked to transfer some cases to Rwanda.  If that 
doesn't happen, can the ICTR still close on time? 
And then another question, Will high-level indictees be 
arrested soon; Mladi  for the ICTY and Kabuga for the ICTR, if 
Kenya decides to cooperate?  So within the Security Council, there 
was discussion over many, many years, but really it only became 
serious, from my point of view, once Austria stepped into a chair of 
the informal working group on international tribunals.  Austria 
worked very, very hard to get an agreement on what happens after 
the closure and the creation of what's called a residual mechanism. 
Austria, to its credit, overcame very serious opposition from 
China and Russia and got a Security Council resolution, as we said, 
on December 22, 2010.  So this resolution will set up residual 
mechanisms, which will embody the legal reality of the ICTY and 
the ICTR after their closure, and the branch for the ICTY of the 
residual mechanism will begin to operate on July 1, 2013, and the 
one for the ICTR on July 1, 2012. 
The ICTY and ICTR will complete the current trials as 
themselves, and the residual mechanism will address issues that arise 
after the closure of—or after those particular dates I just mentioned.  
The locations have been left to be determined, but at the moment, 
discussions are for Arusha and The Hague. 
  I just wanted to mention the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  
I know that Jim Johnson had mentioned it earlier, but we really 
shouldn't forget about it because—with all of these discussions going 
on within the Security Council at a relatively high level and all of the 
preparations going on with the tribunals—they have been, in some 
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sense, separate from that of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  The 
Special Court was sort of left high and dry in some respects to just 
figure out its own way to deal with its residual mechanism. 
         And the Special Court has been doing it.  The Special Court is 
very advanced in its completion mandate.  If you look at how many 
things have already been closed down in Freetown, how much has 
already been prepared, and all of the plans that have been put into 
place, the Special Court—even though it has had fewer people to do 
it with—has made substantial progress in this, and it will have its 
own residual mechanism.  But I want to stress something.  There's a 
difference here in the funding mechanisms at the moment, between 
the residual mechanisms for the ICTY and ICTR and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone. 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was rescued in December 
2010 with the contribution of $12.3 million by the United Nations so 
it could continue through to the end of the Charles Taylor trial.  This 
is because it's based on voluntary funding, and it's been having 
severe difficulties raising the money as of late to fund itself. 
The various senior officials of the Court had 171 fundraising 
meetings this past year alone, and did not raise enough money just to 
get to the end of the Charles Taylor trial.  The residual mechanism is 
going to be funded in the same way, through voluntary funding, and 
I have serious worries about how it's going to raise that money after 




Mr. Smith, could you walk us into Trial 2 at the Cambodia 
Tribunal a little bit?  What are the four defendants charged with? 
What was the significance of the Pre-trial Chamber just recently 
confirming the genocide charge against all four of these individuals?   
          
WILLIAM SMITH 
 
Yes.  It's a very important case for Cambodia.  These are the 
main architects and ideologues behind this plan to turn Cambodia 
into a homogenous society, an agricultural society.  Families were 
broken up, young people were forced to marry and procreate, people 
were forced to work 14 hours a day.  So it's—the indictment itself, 
certainly we think it's a very important, very credible document, 
particularly in international criminal law.  It's a document that was 
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about 700 pages long, about 400 pages of fact and law and 
application of them both, and about five and a half thousand 
footnotes supporting the charges. 
And so particularly for Cambodia, where decisions are often 
not reasoned, cases are sort of dealt with in an instant, it is actually a 
very important legacy to have a charge, an indictment, that states the 
case clearly to the defense. 
        The crimes that were charged were, as you said, genocide; 
genocide against the Vietnamese, genocide against the Cham 
community, crimes against humanity, murder, extermination, 
imprisonment, inhumane acts, rape, torture, and also war crimes. 
The Defense appealed the decision. They basically said that 
international customary law—violations of grave breaches, crimes 
against humanity and genocide weren't customary law at the time in 
1975, and, as a result, they can't be charged with that.  It would 
breach the principle of legality.  They said because the Cambodian 
courts—at that time, there were no courts that would prosecute these 
crimes; therefore, they couldn't be prosecuted retrospectively. Also 
in relation to defendant Ieng Sary, the appeal was that he had been 
given an amnesty in the past, therefore he couldn't be prosecuted 
before this court.  So basically they challenged every aspect of the 
indictment. 
The Pre-trial Chamber came back and said, "Look, these 
crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes—were 
customary international law back in 1975."  The Yugoslavia 
Tribunal really just dealt with the issue as to whether or not these 
crimes were customary international law back in the early '90s.  So 
this court had the extra challenge of going back to 1975 to see 
whether or not customary international law had formed to that point 
on these particular crimes. 
So the Pre-trial Chamber rejected all the Defense appeals bar 
two aspects.  First, they said that for crimes against humanity, it's 
required that there be an armed conflict occurring—connected to the 
crimes against humanity—and the Prosecution's position was that an 
armed conflict is not required to prove a crime against humanity. But 
the Pre-trial Chamber found that there was a nexus required between 
those crimes and armed conflict, going back to perhaps how they 
were prosecuted in World War II. 
That point was appealed.  We opposed it, and then the court 
has come down and said, "Look, no, it is a requirement." 
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But just two other aspects:  First, the Pre-trial Chamber has 
given its decision.  The Trial Chamber is not bound by the Pre-trial 
Chamber, and under civil law and under this court, the Trial 
Chamber can legally classify the crimes in the way it wants at the 
end of the case, in any event. 
And the second point, the Trial Chamber that dealt with the 
Duch case, in dealing with crimes against humanity, didn't require a 
nexus with armed conflict.  So in some respects, it seems like a little 
bit of a waste of time because as soon as we go to the Trial Court, 
they rejected that contention in the Duch case.  So it won't really 




And then if you could finish up on this, the second 
divergence of the Pre-trial Chamber from the co-investigating judges 





It's basically the same argument as with the crimes against 
humanity and the nexus. They said back in 1975 to 1979, rape hadn't 
materialized into international customary law as an offense of its 
own, and so it would only be categorized as an "other inhumane act."  
So they did an analysis of the jurisprudence.  Again, the Prosecution 
opposed the Defense in relation to that, but the Pre-trial Chamber 
came out and said, "No, rape wasn't a crime under customary 
international law for crimes against humanity." 
Again, the Trial Chamber in Duch didn't accept that in the 
first trial, and it said, "No, rape was a crime against humanity back in 
’75 to '79."  And so it will be a moot point when it comes to the Trial 




There was a very significant development in 2010 for the 
ICC, and that is the decision to move forward with an investigation 
of Kenya and the 2007-2008 post-electoral violence that occurred 
there. 
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On March 31st, the Pre-trial Chamber granted the 
Prosecutor's request to commence an investigation on crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed in Kenya, and there was a very 
substantive dissenting opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul. He filed a 
dissenting opinion to the Pre-trial Chamber majority decision that, in 
fact, there's a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against 
humanity occurred in Kenya.  Judge Kaul disagreed. 




It's a very interesting issue.  It wasn't on the basis that there 
weren't crimes, that they weren't widespread, that they weren't 
serious, that it didn't merit ICC attention or any of those reasons.  It's 
on a very particular and interesting legal issue that arises from 
Article 7, which is the Crimes Against Humanity section in the 
Rome Statute, which requires that when crimes against humanity are 
charged by the ICC, "the crimes be pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
state or organizational policy."   
What Judge Kaul found is that he focused not on policy, but 
on “state” or “organizational.”  What he found is that, okay, it can be 
either a state or non-state party; that's fine, that wasn't the issue.  But 
what he found is that the organization behind the crimes has to be—
if it's not a state organization, it has to be like a state organization.  It 
has to have the same characteristics as a state organization.  So it has 
to be functioning over a period of time, have effective command, 
been able to implement its orders and capable of committing 
widespread or systematic crimes.  So what he's imagining is if it's 
not a state that's committing these crimes, it's an organization—like a 
rebel organization that is established, that has been functioning and 
so forth.  So Judge Kaul found there was insufficient evidence that 
there was an established organization that was behind the violence.  
And his concern, as he says in his dissent, is that if you don't have 
this requirement of a state or organization behind the crimes, then 
crimes against humanity could be applied to mob violence, 




May I get sort of academic on this?  I think it's fascinating to 
see the debate between Hans-Peter Kaul and the others.  I think it's 
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because this case is the closest we've ever had to that line between 
where you say something is a serious ordinary crime and where you 
say it’s a crime against humanity.  So this entire case, entire set of 
cases, is going to be exploring where that line is. 
I must say, though, that I think Hans-Peter Kaul, with 
respect, ignores the negotiation history behind the state or 




What is happening within the ICC to start to prepare for the 




Well, it sort of is far off in the future, but it doesn't feel, at 
least at the moment, urgent and imminent, and of course, it has to be 
confirmed. 
But I think it raises a number of interesting and challenging 
questions; first of all, how will we go about investigating that crime?  
What kinds of cases will come to the ICC?  How will they do it? 
  Now, I suppose the hope is that the result of this very 
complicated mechanism for getting cases to the court will be that 
only cases where there is some consensus, where there's some 
international support for the case itself, will actually reach the court, 
and therefore, if the court engages one of these crimes of aggression, 
there will be a lot of countries backing it and a lot of support for the 





I must preface this by saying I served on the Canadian 
delegation to the Kampala negotiations (2010) and got to see this 
from the inside—but anything I say is said in my personal capacity.  
With that said, I think that internally, within the ICC, people have to 
educate themselves on what this means, because it's incredibly 
complex. The Assembly of States Parties will have to spend the next 
number of years really looking closely to see if this is workable for 
the Court and make a decision in 2017. 
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There were a wide variety of countries in Kampala, those 
who really wanted the crime of aggression and thought it was 
relatively straightforward, all the way to countries that were really 
worried about including the crime of aggression because of the 




I think it was a great achievement.  I think what happened in 
Kampala was, in my view, really something symbolic.  I think the 
adoption of this article [on aggression] was purely symbolic.  One 
could not leave Kampala without something.  I mean, this review 
conference at the end, what did it produce?  That's where I think I 
agree with Cherif Bassiouni, that there is a need maybe to conduct an 
assessment of the functioning of the ICC. 
Regarding the crime of aggression, for many years we were 
working on it, but we were pragmatic.  What about having this crime 
of aggression when you still have these superpowers, the United 
States and the Soviet Union?  But even though the Soviet Union is 
no longer there, you still have Russia on one side. 
So to say that it was good, we achieved something in 
Kampala with this configuration, seven years later we will review it, 
and I'm not sure that at the time of the review you will have the same 
dynamics, because things may change—I'm not a pessimist, but I 
think much will depend how the world evolves in the coming years.  
